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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper compares owner-occupied housing tax regimes in 
the etherlands and the other countries in the EU-15. The ether-
lands appears to stand apart in two respects. First, in Luxembourg 
and the etherlands owner-occupiers have to include an imputed 
rental income in their taxable income. Second, in the etherlands, 
the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest payments is almost unre-
stricted.  
 
The tax regime of owner-occupied homes increasingly erodes 
the personal income tax base in the etherlands, so that higher tax 
rates are needed to collect a given amount of revenue. However, 
elimination or reduction of the mortgage interest deduction can 
only be realized gradually. 
 
Due to a lack of data both within the various tax regimes and 
across time periods, a comprehensive multivariate time-series 
comparison among the various tax regimes in the EU-15 is not 
possible. Thus, the statistical analysis is limited to bivariate com-
parisons.  
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1. ITRODUCTIO 
 
In Europe, approximately two thirds of the house-
holds own the dwellings that they occupy. In the Neth-
erlands the home ownership rate of 54% lags the Euro-
pean average (VROM-raad, 2004, p. 11). However, the 
Netherlands is gradually closing the gap as the lion’s 
share of new estate construction consists of owner-
occupied houses. In 2002, this share was over 78 per-
cent (CBS, 2005, p. 78). As a result, the share of owner-
occupied dwellings has increased from 39 percent in 
1977 (CBS, 1982, p. 71) to 54 percent in 2002. This is 
consistent with Dutch housing policy as evidenced by a 
statement made by the Dutch housing secretary that “… 
given the housing preferences, the share of [home own-
ers] has to increase considerably” (Parliamentary Pa-
pers, 2000, p. 22).  
 
The goal of enhancing private home ownership 
through public policy has been pursued for decades. 
The government can deploy a number of policy instru-
ments to enhance home ownership. In the past, subsi-
dies for homebuyers were one of these instruments. 
These homebuyer subsidies were aimed at offering peo-
ple in the lowest income brackets a choice of renting a 
home with a rental subsidy or buying a house with a 
purchase subsidy. However, the Dutch government has 
discontinued this policy. The most important policy in-
strument now seems to be the mortgage interest deduc-
tion. This in turn is one of the most sensitive issues in 
modern Dutch politics. There is no theme that politi-
cians deal with as prudently as the deductibility of 
home-mortgage interest. 
 
Successive Dutch cabinets have taken the view that 
the mortgage interest deduction does not constitute a tax 
expenditure. Tax expenditures can be described as “a 
loss of governmental tax revenue attributable to some 
provision of tax law that allows a special exclusion, ex-
emption, or deduction from gross income or that pro-
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vides a special credit, preferential tax rate, or deferral of 
tax liability” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2005). So 
far, all Dutch cabinets have regarded the deductibility of 
mortgage interest as an element of the regular tax struc-
ture rather than a special deduction. As a result, the 
mortgage interest deduction has never been included in 
the list of tax expenditures that the government has pub-
lished on an annual basis from 1999.  
 
To a certain extent this is a logical approach. If a 
taxpayer’s own dwelling is considered a source of in-
come, the income derived from this source should be 
taxed, whereas the cost associated with this income 
should be tax-deductible. This has been the position of 
the Dutch government – irrespective of the coalition’s 
political color. In the Dutch system this would imply 
that an owner-occupied house should be taxed similar to 
other assets (in Box 3).
1
 Currently, however, it is taxed 
together with labor income at a progressive rate (in Box 
1). For the vast majority of taxpayers the current taxa-
tion results in a negative income from owner-occupied 
houses because the deduction of mortgage interest out-
weighs the imputed rental income (0.6 percent of the 
value). Taxation in Box 3 would subject owner-
occupied homes to the presumptive capital income tax 
at a fixed rate of 30 percent that is applied to the 4 per-
cent presumptive return on personally held assets. Ef-
fectively, this implies a net wealth tax at a rate of 1.2 
percent (30 percent of 4 percent). If cars were to be 
treated in the same way, an income derived from a tax-
payer’s own car would be taxed, while it could be bene-
ficial to finance the car with a loan as the interest pay-
ments would be tax-deductible. 
 
The fact that income derived from cars is not taxed 
stresses the arbitrary character of the underlying view.  
                                                           
1
 A concise overview of the box system in the Netherlands is pre-
sented in Box 1 (“Dutch Treat: The analytical box system”). 
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This arbitrariness implies that an alternative approach 
would also be possible. An alternative view could con-
sider an owner-occupied home as part of a taxpayer’s 
personal wealth. As a result, the home would be treated 
in a fashion similar to other assets and taxed as part of 
the taxpayer’s personal wealth. Therefore, the net in-
come derived from an owner-occupied dwelling could 
no longer be negative. Indeed, the OECD has proposed 
to change the homeowner tax system by gradually be-
ginning to treat owner-occupied homes in a manner 
similar to other assets (OECD, 2004, p. 56). Although 
the European Commission does not go quite that far, the 
Commission has criticized the nearly unlimited deducti-
bility of mortgage interest payments in the Netherlands. 
The Commission considers in the reversal of tax-
deductible mortgage interest payments a “promising 
BOX 1 
Dutch Treat: The analytical box system 
 The Dutch income tax system distinguishes three 
types of taxable income that have been classified into 
three so-called boxes. Each box is for certain categories 
of income and has its own tax-rates. 
 Box 1 includes income from employment and home 
ownership. The main income categories in this box are 
wages, pension payments, social benefits, notional in-
come from a company car, profits from (unincorporated) 
business activities, and notional income from owner-
occupied housing. The total income from these sources 
is taxed at progressive rates including social security 
contributions (in 2006: 33.65%, 41.4%, 42%, and 52%). 
 Box 2 is for income from shares and profit-sharing 
certificates that are part of a substantial business inter-
est. This income category is taxed at a (flat) rate of 25% 
(in 2006). 
 Box 3 includes income from savings and invest-
ments. The (flat) rate is 30% (in 2006) and applies to a 
notional fixed yield of 4% of the average total net value 
over the year. 
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avenue to explore”. This could mean an upper limit on 
the amount of interest that is tax-deductible or even the 
abolition of tax-deductible mortgage interest payments 
(European Commission, 2005, p. 94).  
 
In addition, the IMF has suggested three possible 
policy options for phasing out mortgage interest de-
ductibility in the Netherlands: 
1. an immediate and complete removal of tax deducti-
bility; 
2. the introduction of a nominal limit on the size of the 
mortgage loan that qualifies for a tax deduction; 
3. a reduction of the deductible rate. 
In fact, the IMF considers policy option 2 – a limit on 
the tax-deductible amount – to be the most attractive 
(IMF, 2006). 
 
These proposals are understandable given the 
budgetary consequences of the tax regime with regard 
to owner-occupied homes. There are two key aspects to 
this plan that have critical consequences: 1) whether or 
not an imputed income from owner-occupied housing is 
taxed; and 2) whether mortgage interest payments are 
tax-deductible. In the Netherlands, the deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments outweighs the taxation of 
an imputed rental income from the budgetary perspec-
tive. The imputed rent from owner-occupied housing 
broadened the income tax base by €4.6 billion in 2005, 
whereas the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest pay-
ments narrowed the tax base by €22.5 billion (Parlia-
mentary Papers, 2004, p. 41). Therefore, on balance, the 
owner-occupied housing tax regime reduced the income 
tax base by €17.9 billion.  
 
In the remainder of this paper we first investigate 
how a taxpayer’s principal home is fiscally treated in 
the 15 countries that were member states of the Euro-
pean Union prior to May 1, 2004. We will refer to these 
“old” member states as the EU-15 in the rest of this pa-
per. The degree to which the Netherlands stands apart 
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with regard to the owner occupied housing tax regime 
warrants special attention. Next, we deal with the hous-
ing market’s special character and its consequences for 
pricing. This section also will present a theoretical 
analysis of the effects of eliminating the tax-
deductibility of mortgage payments. A cross-national 
comparison of the different tax regimes will allow us to 
determine the degree to which the practices in the vari-
ous EU countries are consistent with the theoretically 
expected effects we develop. Finally, we will present a 
summary and some concluding remarks.  
 
2. OWER-OCCUPIED HOUSIG TAXES I 
THE EU-15 
 
Taxation of owner-occupied housing affects the 
cost of housing. Assuming that an owner-occupied 
dwelling is fully mortgaged, the following key points 
are relevant to the cost of capital for owner-occupiers 
(van den Noord, 2003, p. 6): 
1. whether the mortgage interest payments are tax-
deductible (or, alternatively, whether redemptions are 
tax-deductible) and if so, whether there are restric-
tions as to the period and the amount;
2
 
2. whether tax credits exist; 
3. whether an imputed income from owner-occupied 
dwellings is taxed. 
We have adapted data on the tax regime regarding 
owner-occupied homes in the EU-15 from the Interna-
tional Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD, 2005). 
On the basis of these data (summarized in Table 1) the 
tax regimes can be categorized as follows: 
 
1. o tax breaks 
There are no tax breaks for owner-occupied housing in 
Germany, France, the UK and Sweden. Therefore, the 
                                                           
2
 Premiums for life insurance tied to a mortgage loan, for example, 
are not considered here although they are tax-deductible in some 
countries. 
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net (after tax) mortgage interest rate is equal to the gross 
(or market) interest rate. Mortgage interest payments 
were fully deductible in the UK until 1974. However, 
the tax-deductibility was gradually abolished after-
wards. In 1974, the UK set a ceiling on the size of mort-
gages eligible for interest deductibility. At the time of 
introduction, this ceiling affected few households. How-
ever, the ceiling was not indexed to inflation and it pro-
gressively became more binding as nominal house 
prices rose. In addition, in 1993, the tax rate at which 
the interest on debt held below the ceiling could be de-
ducted was capped below the top income-tax rate. This 
rate was successively reduced such that by 1999 tax de-
ductibility was eliminated altogether (Hendershott, 
Pryce and White, 2003).  
 
2. Tax credit without time limit 
This is the most common tax regime across the EU. 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain fall 
into this category, but the details differ across the coun-
tries. In Belgium, part of the redemption of capital on a 
mortgage loan entitles the taxpayer to a tax credit (up to 
a maximum of €1,830) at the highest marginal rate. In 
Greece, most of the deductions from the taxpayer’s ag-
gregate income have been replaced with tax credits 
from 2003. However, interest payments on mortgage 
loans taken by December 31, 2002 remain deductible. 
The credit is equal to 15 percent of the annual mortgage 
interest on a taxpayer’s home and can only be claimed 
as part of the loan financing not exceeding €200,000. 
Exceptions apply for taxpayers owning a house that ex-
ceeds a certain size. In Ireland, the credit is restricted to 
€5,080 for married or widowed taxpayers or €2,540 for 
single taxpayers. In the first seven years of entitlement, 
the limitations are increased to €8,000 and €4,000, re-
spectively, for first-time buyers only. In Italy, the tax 
credit amounts to 19 percent of the interest payments on 
mortgage loans for owner-occupied homes, up to a 
maximum of €687. In Portugal, the tax credit is equal to 
30 percent of mortgage interest and amortization up to a 
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limit of €539. In addition, a taxpayer may credit 25 per-
cent of the amount deposited annually on a savings ac-
count earmarked for the purchase, construction or resto-
ration of his primary residence (up to €576). In Spain, 
the tax credit amounts to 15 percent of the cost incurred 
for the acquisition or renovation of the taxpayer’s pri-
mary residence up to €9,015 (i.e., a maximum of 
€1,352). If the acquisition or renovation was financed 
with a loan, the credit is 25 percent of the amount paid 
annually (as principal and interest) up to €4,507 in the 
first two years (thereafter 20 percent) and 15 percent of 
the next €4,507 (in any year). Alternatively, a credit 
equal to 15 percent of the amount deposited on a special 
bank account (up to €9,015) with the purpose of acquir-
ing the primary residence is granted. 
 
3. Deductible up to a ceiling, but no time limit 
This applies to Finland and Austria. In Austria, interest 
payments are deductible up to €730 for singles or 
€1,460 for couples and single parents (plus €364 if the 
taxpayer has at least three children). The reduction is 
reduced proportionally to zero between an annual in-
come of €36,400 and €50,900. In Finland, mortgage in-
terest payments are, in principle, only deductible from 
capital income. Losses of the category “income from 
capital” are deductible from capital income during the 
following 10 years. Therefore, Finland would fall in 
category 4 below. The reason why we have included 
Finland in category 3 is that losses of the category in-
come from capital, which is generally caused by de-
ductible interest expenses, may also be deducted indi-
rectly from earned income (an amount equal to 28 per-
cent of the loss is credited against taxes payable on 
earned income). The creditable amount is increased by 
two percentage points for the part of the losses related 
to interest paid for the taxpayer’s first dwelling. The 
deduction is limited to €1,400 per taxpayer (plus €400 
for one child and €800 for two children). 
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4. Deductible from a certain income category 
Denmark and Luxembourg fall into this category. In 
Denmark, mortgage interest payments are only deducti-
ble from capital income. In Luxembourg, mortgage in-
terest payments are only deductible from an imputed 
rental income from the taxpayer’s home, up to a limit 
depending on how long the taxpayer has occupied the 
dwelling and on the household composition. The maxi-
mum deduction varies between €750 and €1,500, in-
creased by the same amount for the spouse and for each 
child belonging to the taxpayer’s household.  
 
5. Almost fully deductible 
This only applies to the Netherlands. Mortgage interest 
was deductible without any restriction until 2001, but 
the past few years some minor limits were introduced. 
In 2001, the deductibility’s duration was limited to a 
maximum of 30 years in particular because mortgages 
without redemptions and no final date were deemed un-
desirable. However, this was the fastest growing cate-
gory.
3
 Another limitation - introduced in 2004 - applies 
if a surplus value is realized at sale. The seller is sup-
posed to use the surplus value to finance the new house. 
As a result, deductibility of interest payments on the 
new loan is limited to the price paid for the new house 
minus the surplus value realized on the old home. Note 
that this does not imply any limitation for first-time 
buyers. A taxpayer who owns a dwelling must include 
an imputed rent in his taxable income. The imputed 
rental income is calculated as a percentage (up to 0.6 
percent) of the value. The maximum imputed rent is 
€8,750.  
 
Large differences in the owner-occupied housing 
tax regimes exist across the EU-15’s member states.
4
 
                                                           
3
 In 1994, only 3 percent of the mortgages were without redemp-
tions against 26 percent in 2002 (Ministry of VROM, 2004, p. 43. 
4
 We only consider the deductibility of mortgage interest payments 
and the taxation of an imputed income from the taxpayer’s own 
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The Netherlands appears to be an exception in that 
mortgage interest payments are almost fully deductible. 
In the other EU-15 member states, mortgage interest is 
not deductible at all or deductible up to a maximum that 
varies from a few hundred to a few thousand euros. 
Dutch taxpayers must include an imputed rental income 
from their own homes in their taxable incomes, which is 
quite rare in the EU-15. Luxembourg is the only other 
country where this exists. In both countries the imputed 
rent is relatively low. The imputed rent of 0.6 percent of 
the home’s value in the Netherlands is meant to be a net 
income (gross income minus cost). At first sight, the 
imputed rental income seems higher in Luxembourg, 
where it is calculated at 4 percent of the unit value up to 
€3,800 and 6 percent of the excess. However, the unit 
value is based on the house’s value on January 1, 1941 
(even if the house was built later).  
 
3. THE HOUSIG MARKET 
 
New housing development adds less than 2 percent 
to the existing housing stock. Supply is thus inelastic in 
the short run as it can hardly adjust to changes in de-
mand for housing.
5
 Flexibility is also very limited in the 
medium run. The decision-making process regarding 
zoning schemes is time consuming - particularly in the 
Netherlands - and developing new housing takes a lot of 
time. Under these circumstances supply hardly affects 
the price. Rather, demand determines housing prices. In 
                                                                                                             
dwelling. As a result, the picture is not complete because other 
allowances may also affect the financing cost of owner-occupied 
housing (see for some examples the end of the section entitled “Ef-
fects of differences in tax regime pertaining to owner-occupied 
housing”. 
5
 Most British studies suggest that the housing supply elasticity is 
less than one. Although American estimates are notably higher, 
Meen (2002, p. 21) suggests that the observed differences are in 
part an artifact of the methodologies. In the cases he has examined 
the similarities are more striking than the differences. 
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addition, external factors including owner-occupied 
housing tax policy affect the housing market. 
 
The effects of introducing deductible mortgage in-
terest can be analyzed with a simple graph. Figure 1 
shows demand curve D0, the long-run supply curve Sl 
and the short-run supply curve Ss. The short-run supply 
curve’s vertical slope results from the hypothesis that 
supply is perfectly inelastic in the short run. In the ini-
tial situation – in which mortgage interest is not tax-
deductible - equilibrium is at the intersection of D0 and 
Sl. This is point E0, where the price amounts to P0 and 
the quantity to Q0. As a result of the introduction of 
mortgage interest deductibility, the demand curve shifts 
from D0 to D1, which has a steeper slope than D0. This 
shift is not parallel as we assume that the benefit of the 
tax-deductibility of mortgage interest increases by 
house price. This seems likely given that (1) the higher 
the income the higher the house price; and (2) the inter-
est will be deducted at a higher marginal rate. It also 
seems likely given the empirical fact that the average 
mortgage loan in the Netherlands in 2002 steadily in-
creased from €77,000 in the third decile to €161,000 in 
the tenth (highest) decile (Ministry of VROM, 2004, p. 
42). 
 
After the introduction of mortgage interest deducti-
bility a new short-run equilibrium arises in the intersec-
tion of the new demand curve (D1) and the short-run 
supply curve (Ss). That is in point E0’, where the price 
(P1) exceeds the price in the initial situation, but the 
quantity has not changed (Q0). The movement from E0 
to E0’ is along the short-run supply curve Sk as supply 
does not respond to price changes in the short run. In 
the long run, the new equilibrium arises in E1, being the 
intersection of the new demand curve (D1) and the long-
run supply curve (Sl). Relative to the short-run equilib-
rium in E0’ the long-run equilibrium in E1 is at a larger 
quantity (Q1) and a lower price (Pl). The movement 
from E0’ to E1 occurs along the new demand curve D1. 
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In the new long-run equilibrium E1 price changes result-
ing from a demand shock are larger than in the initial 
equilibrium. The reason is that they affect net income 
only partially as a result of the tax-deductibility of mort-
gage interest payments. The treasury absorbs the other 
part. The new demand curve’s steeper slope is, thus, the 
graphical expression of the increased housing market’s 
volatility relative to the initial situation.
6
  
 
FIGURE 1 
Effects of Introducing Mortgage Interest Deductibility 
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l
 E1 
 D0 
 
 p0 E0 
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The effects of eliminating the mortgage interest 
deduction mirror those of introducing it. Figure 2 shows 
a situation in which mortgage interest payments are de-
ductible. D1 is de demand curve, Sl the long-run supply 
curve, and Ss the short-run supply curve. Equilibrium 
arises in the intersection of the demand curve (D1) and 
the long-run supply curve Sl. This is in E1, where the 
                                                           
6
 Van den Noord (2003) presents the same conclusion, while illus-
trating it with a model developed by Poterba (1984) and Poterba 
(1991). 
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price is P1 and the quantity Q1. As a result of the elimi-
nation of the mortgage interest deduction the demand 
curve shifts from D1 to D2 and the short-run equilibrium 
shifts from E1 to E1’, where the new demand curve (D2) 
and the short-run supply curve (Ss) intersect. The price 
decreases from P1 to P2 and the quantity remains un-
changed at Q1. This is a movement along the short-run 
supply curve Ss. The new long-run equilibrium arises in 
E2, where the new demand curve (D2) and the long-run 
supply curve (Sl) intersect. The quantity supplied has 
decreased from Q1 to Q2 and the price has increased 
from P2 tot P2
l
 compared to the short-run equilibrium 
situation. This is a movement along the new demand 
curve D2. The new demand curve’s slope is less steep 
than that of the original demand curve D1, which is the 
graphical expression of the reduced volatility of house 
prices. Price changes caused by a demand shock now 
fully affect net incomes and are no longer partially ab-
sorbed by the treasury. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Effects of Eliminating Mortgage Interest Deductibility 
 
 € Ss 
 D1 Sl 
 
 
 
 
 
 p1 E1 
 D2 
 
 p2
l 
E2 
 p2 E1’ 
 
 
 
 
 Q2 Q1 Houses 
 
406 
 
 
 
Other effects of the mortgage interest deduction are 
related to the financing of owner-occupied housing, par-
ticularly leverage (ratio equity/debt). The mortgage in-
terest deductibility leads to a difference between the net 
interest rate (after tax) and the gross interest rate (or 
market rate). If the net return on equity exceeds the net 
mortgage interest rate, it is profitable to finance one’s 
home with debt. This tends to be the case under the pre-
sumptive capital income tax such as that levied in the 
Netherlands. At a (gross) mortgage interest rate of 4 
percent and a marginal tax rate of 52 percent, the net 
interest rate amounts to 1.92 percent. If the gross return 
on equity also amounts to 4 percent, the net return under 
the presumptive capital income tax - with a presumptive 
return of 4 percent and a constant marginal tax rate of 
30 percent - is 2.8 percent.
7
 This is considerably higher 
than the net mortgage interest rate of 1.92 percent, al-
though the gross return on equity is equal to that on debt 
(4 percent). At a mortgage interest rate of 4 percent, 
taxpayers with a marginal tax rate of 52 percent will 
have an incentive to finance their home with debt if the 
gross return on equity exceeds 2.74 percent.
8
 If the 
gross return on equity exceeds 4 percent, the net return 
increases by the full difference. For example, if the 
gross return on equity amounts to 6 percent, the net re-
turn will also increase by 2 percentage points to 4.8 per-
cent. It can be expected that a homeowner will finance 
his home to a larger extent with debt, relative to both 
the value and his income, when the mortgage interest 
deduction is more generous. 
 
The share of owner-occupied homes in the housing 
stock is relevant to the assessment of the effectiveness 
of policies aimed at enhancing home-ownership. If 
mortgage interest deductibility is effective in increasing 
                                                           
7
 This example does not consider an allowance. 
8
 A gross return of 2.74 percent equals a net return of 1.92 percent 
under the presumptive capital income tax.  
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home-ownership, the share of owner-occupied housing 
in the housing stock will – ceteris paribus - increase. 
Thus, we expect that as the mortgage deduction in-
creases: 
1. a larger proportion of the house price will be fi-
nanced with debt; 
2. the total of mortgage debt will be higher; 
3. the share of owner-occupied housing in the housing 
stock will be larger.
9
 
 
4. EFFECTS OF DIFFERECES I TAX 
REGIME O OWER-OCCUPIED HOUSIG 
 
In the Netherlands, mortgage interest has been tax-
deductible for over a century. The deduction was intro-
duced in 1893 as an element of the first personal income 
tax. For the purpose of empirical testing not only the 
introduction of mortgage interest deduction is relevant, 
but also the extent that taxpayers make use of it. Begin-
ning in the 1990s the use of this deduction has intensi-
fied. The number of newly registered mortgages was 
constant in the late 1980s at a level of approximately 
200,000 per year. In 1995, however, this number rose to 
over 650,000 (Parliamentary Papers, 2000, p. 303). Al-
though this increase is partly attributable to the renewals 
of existing mortgages it in turn contributed to a more 
intensive use of the mortgage interest deduction. Fre-
quently, the presence of a surplus value in the house led 
to an increase of the new mortgage loan over the old 
loan. Other causes of a more intensive use of the mort-
gage interest deduction are the increase in the number 
of houses (to 3.5 million in 1999 from 2.6 million in 
1990), the rising house prices, and the development of 
                                                           
9
 This crowding out effect results from the fact that tax deductions 
raise the rate of return on investments in owner-occupied housing 
relative to other assets. Empirical support for this effect can be 
found in a number of studies as cited in Gervais (2002). 
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new mortgage types.
10
 The increased use of the mort-
gage interest deduction also increased its budgetary sig-
nificance. The budgetary amounts involved (in current 
prices) grew from €3.4 billion in 1990 to over €7.3 bil-
lion in 1999 (Parliamentary Papers, 2000, p. 318).  
 
In an efficient market, the current value of ex-
pected housing subsidies would be included in housing 
prices no matter the form the subsidies take (tax expen-
ditures or direct subsidies). If the mortgage deduction’s 
quantitative significance increases, a greater volatility 
of house prices can be expected, as we concluded in the 
previous section. Thus, a relatively high degree of vola-
tility in the pricing market can be expected in the Neth-
erlands given the almost unrestricted tax-deductibility 
of mortgage interest payments and the intensified use of 
this deduction. The opposite should be true in other 
countries where this deduction is limited or non-
existent. Until the 1990s, volatility of housing prices in 
the Netherlands hardly differed from the average in the 
OECD area. However, this has changed in a short pe-
riod of time. In 2002 volatility in the Netherlands was 
the highest in the OECD area (see for the underlying 
data OECD, 2004, p. 51).
11
  
 
Given the differences in the owner-occupied hous-
ing tax shown in section 2 (“Owner-occupied housing 
taxes in the EU-15”), it seems obvious to expect differ-
ences in the way that owner-occupied homes are fi-
nanced as well as the share of owner-occupied houses 
present in the housing stock. Table 1 shows that impor-
tant differences among countries do exist. However, 
they are not always consistent with the expectations. It 
should be noted that the possibilities for statistical 
                                                           
10
 Particularly relevant is the mortgage without redemptions lead-
ing to a higher outstanding debt during the loan’s term relative to 
traditional mortgage types.  
11
 The development in the Netherlands is consistent with the expec-
tation and with the analysis of van den Noord (2003). 
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analyses are very limited. Only bivariate comparisons 
across the various tax regimes are possible because of 
the relative scarcity of data both within the various tax 
regimes and across time periods. The fact that mortgage 
debt relative to GDP is the highest in the Netherlands 
(78.8 percent as the last line in the third column of Ta-
ble 1 shows) is consistent with the expectation. This ra-
tio almost doubled in a decade, up from 40 percent in 
1992. However, the countries without tax breaks 
(France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK; mean: 43.8 
percent) are not, as expected, at the bottom of the list. 
Italy and Greece have tax credits for homeowners, 
whereas mortgage interest is deductible from capital 
income in Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the ratios of total 
mortgage debt and GDP in these countries (11.4 per-
cent, 13.9 percent, and 17.5 percent, respectively) are 
lower than in France (22.8 percent) and considerably 
lower than in Sweden (40.4 percent), Germany (54.0 
percent), and the UK (58.0 percent). However, compari-
sons of the variability of mortgage debt relative to GDP 
within owner-occupied housing tax regimes are more 
consistent with expectations. The variability of the ra-
tios of total mortgage debt and GDP for countries with-
out tax breaks is lower (coefficient of variation, CV: 
36.3 percent) than the variability for countries with tax 
credits (CV: 50.0 percent) and considerably lower than 
those countries where mortgage interest is deductible 
from capital income (CV: 87.5 percent). 
 
The expectation that the loan to value ratio of the 
home would be the highest in the Netherlands is met. 
The Netherlands is on top of the list with a ratio of 90 
percent (see the last line in column 4 of Table 1). How-
ever, countries without tax breaks are not at the bottom 
of the list. Although Italy and Ireland grant tax credits 
to homeowners, the loan to value ratio in these countries 
(55 percent and 66 percent, respectively) is even lower 
than in countries without tax breaks. In two of these 
countries (France and Germany) this ratio amounts to 
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67 percent, so the difference with Ireland and Italy is 
small.  
TABLE 1 
Total Mortgage Debt (Relative to both GDP and House Value) 
and Share of Homeowners 
 
  Mortgage debts Ratio of mort- Share of  
    as % of GDP gage loan and homeowners 
   value of the  
  1992 2002 house (in %) 1990 2002 % change 
 
o tax breaks 
France 21.0 22.8 67 54 55 1.9 
Germany 38.7 54.0 67 39 42 7.7 
Sweden 37.5 40.4 77 56 61 8.9 
UK  55.5 58.0 78 64 68 6.3 
 
CVa 36.9 36.3   8.4 19.6 19.5 49.9 
 
Tax credit with- 
out a time limit 
Belgium 19.9 27.9 83 67 71 5.9 
Greece   4.0 13.9 75 76 83 9.2 
Ireland 20.5 36.5 66 79 77 -2.5 
Italy  6.3 11.4 55 68 80 17.6 
Portugal 12.8 49.3 83 67 64 -4.5 
Spain 11.9 32.3 70 78 85 9.0 
 
CV  54.0 50.0 15.0 7.9 10.3 141.6 
 
Deductible up  
to a ceiling, but  
no time limit 
Austria … … 60 55 56 1.8 
Finland 37.2 31.8 75 67 58 -13.4 
 
CV  … … 15.7 13.9 2.5 185.7 
 
Deductible from 
a certain income 
category 
Denmark 63.9 74.3 80 52 51 -1.9 
Luxembourg 23.9b 17.5 … 64 70 9.4 
 
CV  64.4 87.5 ... 14.6 22.2 214.4 
 
Almost fully 
deductible 
Netherlands 40.0 78.8 90 45 53 17.8 
 
a. CV = coefficient of variation 
b. 1994  
Source: Catte et al (2004), p. 18.` 
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However, the loan to value ratio is considerably higher 
in the other two countries without tax breaks: the UK 
(78 percent) and Sweden (77 percent). On the other 
hand, the variability of the loan to value ratio of the 
home within tax regimes is more consistent with expec-
tations. The variability of the loan to value ratio of the 
home for countries without tax breaks is lower (CV: 8.4 
percent) than the variability for countries with tax cred-
its (CV: 15.0 percent) and those countries with a ceiling 
set on the size of mortgages eligible for interest de-
ductibility (CV: 15.7 percent).  
 
Finally, Table 1 also shows that the share of owner-
occupied homes in the housing stock was the lowest (42 
percent) in Germany in 1992. This is consistent with the 
expectation, as German homeowners do not enjoy any 
tax break. Given the nearly unrestricted tax-
deductibility of mortgage interest payments in the Neth-
erlands it is against expectation, however, that the share 
of homeowners in the Netherlands (53 percent)
12
 is the 
third lowest after Germany and Denmark. In the three 
other countries without tax breaks the share of home-
owners is higher: 55 percent in France, 61 percent in 
Sweden, and 68 percent in the UK. Apart from that, the 
share of homeowners in the Netherlands increased at the 
fastest pace in the 1990s (with 17.8 percent). Notably, 
the share of homeowners did not decrease in any of the 
countries without tax breaks. This is especially notable 
for the UK, where the tax-deductibility of mortgage in-
terest payments was gradually eliminated in this period. 
Obviously, the deduction’s elimination did not prevent 
the share of homeowners from rising by 6.3 percent. 
The variability of the percentage change in the share of 
homeowners from 1990 to 2002 for countries without 
tax breaks is considerably lower (CV: 49.9 percent) 
than the variability for countries with a tax credit (CV: 
                                                           
12
 According to the source of Table 1 it is 53 percent, however ac-
cording to the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics it is 54 percent 
(see CBS, 2005, p. 80). 
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141.6 percent), those countries where mortgage interest 
is deductible from capital income (CV: 185.7 percent) 
and those countries that have a ceiling set on the size of 
mortgages eligible for interest deductibility (CV: 214.4 
percent).  
 
Table 2 displays for a smaller number of countries 
three other characteristics of the mortgage market: the 
relative increase of total mortgage debt, the share of 
homeowners without debt, and the ratio of the loan rela-
tive to income. Again, the differences are great and not 
completely consistent with expectations. The Nether-
lands scores high in growth of the total mortgage debt in 
the 1990s (147 percent, see the last line of column 2 in 
Table 2), but it ranks second. In Ireland (with a tax 
credit up to a maximum) the total mortgage debt grew 
by 208 percent. Consistent with the expectation, France 
(with no tax breaks)  has the lowest growth of total 
mortgage debt of the countries considered. Although 
there are no tax breaks in the UK, the growth of total 
mortgage debts is approximately the same as in Den-
mark, where mortgage interest can only be deducted 
from capital income. 
 
The share of homeowners without a mortgage is 
highest in Italy (87 percent) and lowest in the Nether-
lands (12.5 percent). The latter is consistent with the 
expectation, but in general the differences hardly seem 
associated with the tax-deductibility of mortgage inter-
est payments. Although in France – with no tax breaks - 
55 percent of homeowners do not have a mortgage, the 
differences with some other countries where tax breaks 
do exist – including Ireland (56.8 percent) and Austria 
and Belgium (60.8 percent) – are limited. The variabil-
ity of the share of homeowners without a mortgage for 
countries without tax breaks (CV: 19.5 percent) is ap-
proximately the same as that for countries with a tax 
credit (CV: 19.9 percent). 
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TABLE 2 
Homeowners and Mortgage Loans 
 
 Growth of total Homeowners    Loan  
 mortgage debt      without   relative 
    1990-2000     mortgage to income 
       (in %)       (in %)  
 
o tax breaks 
France 16 55.0 1.19 
UK 52 41.7 2.66 
 
CVa 74.9 19.5 54.0 
 
Tax credit with- 
out a time limit 
Belgium 77 60.8 0.97 
Ireland 208 56.8 2.30 
Italy  98 87.0 0.44 
Spain 126 76.0 2.92 
 
CV  45.2 19.9 69.3 
 
Deductible up  
to a ceiling, but  
no time limit 
Austria … 60.8 0.97 
 
Deductible from  
a certain income 
category 
Denmark   51 16.3 2.23 
 
Almost fully  
deductible 
Netherlands 147 12.5 3.76 
 
a. CV = coefficient of variation 
 
Source: Neuteboom (2004), p. 172. 
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With regard to the size of the loan relative to in-
come the Netherlands is on top of the list with a ratio of 
3.76. Although this is consistent with the expectation, 
the differences in this ratio also seem barely related to 
the deductibility of mortgage interest. In countries with-
out tax breaks one would expect the lowest ratios. Yet, 
the ratios in France (1.19) and the UK (2.66) are con-
siderably higher than in countries with tax breaks: Italy 
(with a ratio of 0.44 at the bottom of the list) and Aus-
tria and Belgium (0.97). On the other hand, the variabil-
ity of the loan to income ratio within tax regimes is 
more consistent with expectations. The variability of the 
loan to income ratio for countries without tax breaks is 
lower (CV: 54.0 percent) than the variability for coun-
tries with a tax credit (CV: 69.3 percent).  
 
The effects of differences in tax regimes regarding 
owner-occupied housing are thus not always consistent 
with theoretical expectations. This may imply that the 
underlying hypotheses tentatively have to be rejected, 
but this is not necessarily true. Deviations from theo-
retical expectations might also be related to other fac-
tors. These may include historical and cultural differ-
ences between countries as well as other matters of pub-
lic policy. 
 
First, tax aspects other than the tax-deductibility of 
mortgage interest and the taxation of an imputed rental 
income may be associated with owner-occupied hous-
ing. At least five aspects may be relevant: 
1. Whether a capital gains tax includes gains resulting 
from the sale of a taxpayer’s own home (and whether 
a loss can be compensated). 
2. Whether a wealth tax covers owner-occupied homes 
and if so, how. In the Netherlands, for example, 
owner-occupied homes are not subject to the pre-
sumptive capital income tax that applies to other as-
sets. Rather, they are taxed together with labor in-
come. Because most taxpayers derive a negative in-
come from their own home, they effectively enjoy a 
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deduction on their labor income which is subject to a 
progressive tax rate structure. 
3. Is VAT also imposed on newly built houses and if so, 
which rate is applicable? 
4. Is there a real estate transfer tax and if so, at which 
rate? 
5. How is the death tax applied to family-occupied 
homes? 
 
Second, government can enhance homeownership 
through direct expenditure. No home-owner tax breaks 
exist in Germany, but subsidies for investments in 
building society savings contracts do exist (Börsch-
Supan and Eymann, 2000). This also holds true for 
Luxembourg. In the Netherlands, direct expenditure 
took the form of purchase subsidies in the past. How-
ever, these subsidies have been abolished. Apart from 
this, other measures can act as a subsidy and, therefore, 
produce the same effect as direct expenditure aimed at 
enhancing homeownership. In the Netherlands, for ex-
ample, this is true for the so-called national mortgage 
guarantee. Homebuyers meeting certain conditions can 
apply this guarantee resulting in a lower mortgage inter-
est rate.
13
  
 
5. DISCUSSIO 
 
In the Netherlands owner-occupied homes are con-
sidered a source of income. Therefore, taxpayers must 
include an imputed rental income from their own homes 
in their taxable incomes, which is taxed together with 
labor income at a progressive rate. However, the cost 
associated with this income source – including mort-
gage interest – is deductible. The imputed (net) rental 
income is calculated as 0.6 percent of the value up to a 
maximum of €8,750. Mortgage interest payments are 
                                                           
13
 As the lenders basically do not render any financial risk, they 
usually give borrowers a 0.2-0.25 percent-points discount on the 
interest rate (Ministry of VROM, 2004, p. 58). 
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tax-deductible with almost no restrictions. This ap-
proach is arbitrary for two reasons. First, the value 
could be set at another (higher) level. Second, owner-
occupied homes could also be subjected to the same tax 
regime that applies to other personal assets.
14
  
 
The differences in the owner occupied housing tax 
regime across countries in the EU-15 are large. The 
Netherlands stands apart in that it is one of the few 
countries where an imputed rental income from the tax-
payer’s home is taxable, while it is the only country 
where almost no restrictions exist on the deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments. In other countries of the 
EU-15, mortgage interest payments are not deductible 
or are only deductible up to a maximum that varies from 
a few hundred up to a few thousand euros. From a 
budgetary point of view the mortgage interest deducti-
bility far outweighs the taxation of the imputed rental 
income. In 2005, the mortgage interest deduction nar-
rowed the personal income tax base by €22.5 billion, 
whereas the imputed rental income broadened it by €4.6 
billion (Parliamentary Papers, 2004a, p. 41). Thus, the 
tax regime with regard to owner-occupied homes de-
creased the tax base on balance by €17.9 billion. The 
vast majority of homeowners derive a negative fiscal 
income from their own homes. Given that it is taxed 
together with a taxpayer’s labor income, an owner-
occupied home usually has the same effect as a deduc-
tion on labor income.  
 
Certain effects can be expected from differences in 
tax regime regarding owner-occupied dwellings. Statis-
tical data are blurred in that they are not completely 
consistent with the expected effects. Therefore, support 
for the underlying hypotheses is not, at present, com-
plete. Portions of the data inconsistent with the hy-
                                                           
14
 It is conceivable that such a move would be coupled to an addi-
tional allowance for owner-occupied homes. 
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potheses put forth may result from cultural and histori-
cal differences between countries as well as differences 
in other public policies. The latter includes other tax 
aspects than the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments and the taxation of an imputed rental income 
from owner-occupied homes. The possible tax aspects 
include a wealth tax, a capital gains tax, a Value Added 
Tax, a real estate transfer tax, and a death tax. In addi-
tion, the government may enhance homeownership with 
direct expenditure as opposed to tax expenditure. 
 
To collect a given amount of revenue, tax rates 
must be higher if the tax base is lower. Rate reductions 
can be realized along two lines: cutting spending or 
broadening the tax base. Given the budgetary signifi-
cance of the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest pay-
ments in the Netherlands, spending cuts would have to 
be very large to engender the same budgetary effect as 
eliminating the mortgage interest deduction. Therefore, 
a substantial rate reduction in the personal income tax 
does not seem possible without reducing the mortgage 
interest deduction in one way or another. The most ob-
vious solution seems to move owner-occupied dwell-
ings from Box 1 to Box 3.  
 
However, the government has to respect existing 
contracts. People have bought a house and have com-
mitted themselves to long-term financial obligations in 
the expectation that mortgage interest payments will be 
tax-deductible. Therefore, the almost unrestricted mort-
gage interest deduction can only be phased out gradu-
ally. One of the reasons for the IMF to consider intro-
ducing a nominal limit on the tax-deductibility compo-
nent of mortgage loans (an attractive policy option) is 
that it has a gradual impact on households. The nominal 
limit tends to only become binding for low- and me-
dium-income households over time, as house prices in-
crease.  
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The OECD also emphasizes that a new tax regime 
should be introduced gradually by only applying it to 
incremental purchases of owner-occupied housing.  
They present the following example: Suppose that an 
owner-occupier moves from a house worth €500,000 
with a €300,000 mortgage to a house worth €700,000 
with a €500,000 mortgage. He would continue to in-
clude an imputed rental income based on the value of 
the former home (worth €500,000) less interest charges 
on the old mortgage (€300,000) in Box 1 (labor income) 
of the personal income tax system. However, the incre-
mental €200,000 of housing assets (€700,000 minus 
€500,000) and the associated increase in mortgage debt 
of the same amount would be included in Box 3 (in-
come from net wealth) of the personal income tax sys-
tem (OECD, 2004, pp. 64-65). This would not generate 
any extra tax liability, as there is no increase in net 
wealth. Nevertheless, the owner-occupier would pay 
more tax than under the current system because he 
would no longer be able to deduct interest on the addi-
tional €200,000 mortgage debt from labor income.  
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